"But it was the prosecuting side that demanded this reading,"
Nekhludoff said, with surprise.
"That does not matter. There might have been reasons for the
defence to demand this reading, too."
"Oh, but there could have been no reason whatever for that."
"It is a ground for appeal, though. To continue: 'Secondly,' he
went on reading, 'when Maslova's advocate, in his speech for the
defence, wishing to characterise Maslova's personality, referred
to the causes of her fall, he was interrupted by the president
calling him to order for the alleged deviation from the direct
subject. Yet, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the Senate,
the elucidation of the criminal's characteristics and his or her
moral standpoint in general has a significance of the first
importance in criminal cases, even if only as a guide in the
settling of the question of imputation.' That's point two," he
said, with a look at Nekhludoff.
"But he spoke so badly that no one could make anything of it,"
Nekhludoff said, still more astonished.
"The fellow's quite a fool, and of course could not be expected
to say anything sensible," Fanarin said, laughing; "but, all the
same, it will do as a reason for appeal. Thirdly: 'The president,
in his summing up, contrary to the direct decree of section 1,
statute 801, of the criminal code, omitted to inform the jury
what the judicial points are that constitute guilt; and did not
mention that having admitted the fact of Maslova having
administered the poison to Smelkoff, the jury had a right not to
impute the guilt of murder to her, since the proofs of wilful
intent to deprive Smelkoff of life were absent, and only to
pronounce her guilty of carelessness resulting in the death of
the merchant, which she did not desire.' This is the chief
point."
"Yes; but we ought to have known that ourselves. It was our
mistake."
"And now the fourth point," the advocate continued. "The form of
the answer given by the jury contained an evident contradiction.
Maslova is accused of wilfully poisoning Smelkoff, her one object
being that of cupidity, the only motive to commit murder she
could have had. The jury in their verdict acquit her of the
intent to rob, or participation in the stealing of valuables,
from which it follows that they intended also to acquit her of
the intent to murder, and only through a misunderstanding, which
arose from the incompleteness of the president's summing up,
omitted to express it in due form in their answer. Therefore an
answer of this kind by the jury absolutely demanded the
application of statutes 816 and 808 of the criminal code of
procedure, i.e., an explanation by the president to the jury of
the mistake made by them, and another debate on the question of
the prisoner's guilt."